Named, Then Hit
Iran warned on 27 October that every Sinokor tanker would face "legal action" from 1 November, and two Sinokor-linked supertankers were hit on 10 and 11 November.
Iran warned on 27 October that every Sinokor tanker would face "legal action" from 1 November, and two Sinokor-linked supertankers were hit on 10 and 11 November. The strikes fit a campaign against one named company and they fit a record season in which the largest carrier in the strait is hit as a matter of course. The warning was addressed to cargo owners and insurers, and their response is the measure that will separate the two.
On 10 November a projectile struck the supertanker Fujairah Energy on passage out of the Gulf from Ruwais. Four of its 22 crew were hurt. A day later a second projectile hit the Dominica Prosperity about 14 nautical miles northwest of Ras Al-Khaimah as it left the Strait of Hormuz, set its engine room on fire and forced all 22 crew off the ship. Both tankers sail for one South Korean company, Sinokor.
Two weeks earlier Iran had put that fleet on notice. On 27 October the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, the body Tehran created to license passage, announced that Sinokor ships had committed the most violations of its transit rules and that at least seven had already met "enforcement actions". From 1 November, it said, "legal action" would be taken against all vessels of the company. The authority had never before threatened an owner's entire fleet.
The target is the largest one available. Sinokor made 47 percent of supertanker transits through Hormuz in September and more than half in early October, and it carried close to 40 percent of the crude that left the strait in September.
That scale cuts both ways. October brought 37 recorded attacks on shipping, the most of any month of the war, and at least ten more followed in the first ten days of November. Tanker transits rose over the same month to a wartime high of 418. In a strait that busy and that dangerous, the company supplying half the supertankers will be hit often without anyone choosing it. By the time of the warning the trade press had counted seven Sinokor ships attacked since July, set against roughly eighty recorded attacks on vessels of every type from July to October. Two of those seven were struck on consecutive days, 3 and 4 October, before any fleet-wide threat existed. The same count shows none in the first nine days after the deadline.
Two readings fit. In the first, Iran has begun doing what it announced, and two ships of one fleet in two days open a campaign against a named company. In the second, the strikes are the ordinary toll of a record season falling on its biggest carrier, and the warning adds a label to attacks that would have happened anyway. The available numbers cannot choose, and Iran's own account of the week's tanker explosions cites the route the ships took. Most owners now decline to report attacks at all. The attack tallies cover every kind of ship while Sinokor's share covers supertankers. Nobody has published the company's share of traffic since the deadline passed. Korean shipowners add that the ships Iran cited were sub-chartered to a foreign oil company.
The warning itself points to a better test. It was addressed to cargo owners, insurers and other "stakeholders", the parties who decide whether a Sinokor hull gets a cargo and at what premium. Tehran's only instruments against them are its weapons and a list that now runs to 239 ships. If charterers and underwriters start treating one owner's fleet as a separate risk, Sinokor's share of November transits will fall, and Tehran will have rerouted Gulf oil with a notice and two hits. A share that holds near half would leave the notice as paper.